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A NEW STRATEGY FOR REGULATING 
ARBITRATION 
Sarath Sanga 
ABSTRACT—Confidential arbitration is a standard precondition to 
employment. But confidential arbitration prevents a state from ensuring or 
even knowing whether employees’ economic, civil, and due process rights 
are respected. Further, employers regularly require employees to waive 
rights to class proceedings (thereby foreclosing small claims) and to arbitrate 
under the laws of another jurisdiction (thereby evading mandatory state law). 
In response, states have tried to regulate arbitration provisions, arbitral 
awards, and arbitral processes. But these efforts have all failed because the 
Supreme Court says they are preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. 
In this Article, I argue that states can and should adopt a new strategy: 
Deter parties from forming such contracts in the first place. 
The Article proceeds in three parts. First, I explain the problem. Over 
the last fifty years, the Supreme Court systematically immunized arbitration 
provisions against every plausible contract defense. Yet the Supreme Court 
continues to insist that, just as the Federal Arbitration Act requires, 
arbitration agreements are still subject to “generally applicable contract 
defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”1 This is false. 
Second, I present the first large-scale evidence on the pervasiveness of 
arbitration. The Supreme Court’s arbitration precedents have effect only to 
the extent private parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. To study this, I use 
machine-learning protocols to parse millions of filings with the Securities 
and Exchange Commission and create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts 
formed by public companies. These contracts include employment 
agreements, credit agreements, joint ventures, purchases, and others. 
Employment contracts are by far the most likely to include a mandatory 
arbitration provision. 
Finally, I argue that, because the Supreme Court has all but stripped 
states of their power to enforce contracts, states should adopt policies that 
deter formation of objectionable contracts. For example, states cannot 
prohibit forced arbitration of sexual harassment claims. They can, however, 
prohibit sexual harassment as a subject matter for employment contracts; 
 
 1 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996). 
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they can also enforce this with civil penalties and whistleblower rewards. 
Similarly, states cannot stop an employer from arbitrating under the laws of 
another jurisdiction, thereby evading mandatory limits on noncompete 
agreements. But states can declare noncompetes illegal, levy civil fines on 
employers that form them, and again offer employees whistleblower rewards 
to report violations. These approaches work because they create a cause of 
action for a third party—the state—who is not subject to the arbitration 
agreement. And unlike past efforts, these laws would not be preempted 
because they do not “derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to 
arbitrate is at issue.”2 
 
AUTHOR—Assistant Professor, Northwestern University Pritzker School of 
Law. I thank Andrew Verstein, Max Schanzenbach, Roberta Romano, Jide 
Nzelibe, Daniel Hemel, Ezra Friedman, Christopher R. Drahozal, Shari 
Diamond, Richard R.W. Brooks, and Ian Ayres for very helpful comments. 
This research was supported by the Northwestern University Pritzker School 
of Law Faculty Research Program. Author’s email: 
sanga@northwestern.edu. 
 
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1123 
I. HOW STATES LOST CONTROL OVER CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT ......................... 1128 
A. The Supreme Court’s Position .................................................................. 1128 
B. The “National Policy Favoring Arbitration” ........................................... 1129 
C. The End of Contract Defenses .................................................................. 1137 
D. Is There Any Limit to Arbitration? ............................................................ 1144 
E. Conclusion ................................................................................................ 1149 
II. NEW EVIDENCE ON THE PERVASIVENESS OF  EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION .......... 1149 
A. Data Collection ......................................................................................... 1150 
B. Results ...................................................................................................... 1151 
C. The Principal Challenge of Machine Learning in Empirical  
Legal Studies............................................................................................. 1152 
III. WHAT STATES CAN DO ...................................................................................... 1153 
A. The Strategy: Deterrence over Enforcement ............................................. 1153 
B. Example 1: Indirect Enforcement ............................................................. 1154 
C. Example 2: Preventing (Mandatory) Arbitration ...................................... 1158 
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 1160 
 
 
 2 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). 
113:1121 (2019) A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration 
1123 
INTRODUCTION 
In Tishomingo, a small town in southern Oklahoma, Eddie Lee Howard 
entered into a seemingly unenforceable contract.3 Howard had agreed to 
work for Nitro-Lift, a company that supplies nitrogen to oil and gas 
extractors. He also agreed not to work for any competing business for two 
years after leaving Nitro-Lift.4 This last provision—a standard covenant not 
to compete—is valid and enforceable in nearly every state. 
But not in Oklahoma. Under Oklahoma law, 
[a] person who makes an agreement with an employer . . . not to compete with 
the employer after the employment relationship has been terminated, shall be 
permitted to engage in the same business as that conducted by the former 
employer [and] . . . any provision in a contract between an employer and an 
employee [to the contrary] shall be void and unenforceable.5 
Howard put this law to the test. He left Nitro-Lift and immediately went 
to work for a competing business. He also filed suit in the District Court of 
Johnston County, Oklahoma, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 
covenant not to compete was void and unenforceable. As a matter of law, the 
noncompete was indeed void. But Howard had a problem: his contract also 
contained a broad arbitration agreement that required him to submit any 
dispute to an arbitrator. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), along with a 
mountain of Supreme Court precedent, left no doubt that this provision must 
be specifically enforced.6 Recognizing this, the trial court dutifully applied 
federal law and dismissed Howard’s claim.7 
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, had other ideas. It reversed 
the trial court and declared that “the existence of an arbitration agreement in 
an employment contract does not prohibit judicial review of the underlying 
agreement.”8 The Oklahoma court must have known that it was clearly 
disregarding federal law, which unambiguously provides that an arbitration 
agreement in an employment contract does prohibit judicial review.9 
Nevertheless, the Oklahoma Supreme Court issued a judgment in favor of 
Howard and voided the noncompete. Nitro-Lift appealed. 
 
 3 The facts come from Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 24–25 (Okla. 2011). 
 4 Id. at 24 n.8. It further provided that a “competing business” was any business engaged in “the use 
of non-cryogenically generated nitrogen for applications on wellsites in the oil and gas industry in the 
United States.” Id. (insertions omitted). 
 5 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219A(A)–(B) (West 2018). 
 6 See infra Part I. 
 7 Howard, 273 P.3d at 25. 
 8 Id. at 23. 
 9 See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 
465 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1984). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court summarily reversed. In a terse per curiam 
opinion, it admonished the Oklahoma Supreme Court for “disregard[ing] this 
Court’s precedents on the FAA”10 and “insist[ing] that its own jurisprudence 
control[led] this issue.”11 It also reminded Oklahoma of what should have 
been obvious: “[T]he FAA . . . is ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’”12 and 
“once the Court has spoken, it is the duty of other courts to respect that 
understanding of the governing rule of law.”13 
The U.S. Supreme Court was correct. Yet the Oklahoma court had its 
reasons. The problem in Nitro-Lift v. Howard was that arbitration might have 
led to enforcement of the noncompete—in contravention of (seemingly) 
mandatory state law. Why? Because Howard’s contract provided not only 
that arbitration would take place outside of Oklahoma (in Houston, Texas) 
but also, crucially, that the arbitrator would apply Louisiana law. Under 
Louisiana law, Howard’s noncompete would be valid and enforceable.14 
The result thus hinged on the forum. An Oklahoma court would 
disregard the choice of Louisiana law and void the noncompete.15 What is 
not clear, however, is whether an arbitrator would conduct the same conflict 
of laws analysis. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has all but encouraged 
arbitrators to ignore the “complexity and uncertainty” of conflict of laws and 
simply apply the law that the parties chose.16 If an arbitrator were to heed the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s advice, apply Louisiana law, and issue an award 
upholding the noncompete, then the FAA would leave Oklahoma state courts 
no choice but to enforce that award, even if it clearly erred in its conflict of 
law analysis, and even if enforcement would contravene Oklahoma policy.17 
Nitro-Lift teaches us what most sophisticated parties already know: contracts 
 
 10 Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20 (2012). 
 11 Id. at 21 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). 
 12 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2). 
 13 Id. (quoting Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298, 312 (1994)). 
 14 Section 23:921(C) of the Louisiana code provides: 
Any person . . . who is employed as an agent, servant, or employee may agree with his employer 
to refrain from carrying on or engaging in a business similar to that of the employer . . . [for a 
period] not to exceed . . . two years from termination of employment. 
LA. STAT. ANN. § 23:921(C) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 15 The Oklahoma Supreme Court referenced the parties’ choice of Louisiana law, but did not even 
consider the potential conflicts analysis. Instead, it tacitly held that the Oklahoma statute applies 
regardless of the parties’ choice of law. Howard v. Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C., 273 P.3d 20, 24, 26–29 
(Okla. 2011). 
 16 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001); see infra Section III.B. 
 17 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 9–11 (2012) (providing the exclusive grounds for vacatur and modification of 
awards, which does not include public policy grounds); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 
(1984), discussed in Section I.D, below. 
113:1121 (2019) A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration 
1125 
can bootstrap their way out of mandatory state law by pairing an arbitration 
provision with a choice of law clause.18 
States, it would seem, are powerless to stop this. Under federal law and 
Supreme Court precedent, there is virtually no circumstance under which a 
state or federal court may refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement or 
arbitral award.19 Even awards that make egregious errors in law must be 
enforced.20 But states have an interest in ensuring the enforcement of their 
own laws. They also have an interest in ensuring certain procedural 
protections for employees that a confidential, one-on-one proceeding cannot 
provide.21 Given these interests and the constraints of federal arbitration law, 
what can states do? 
In this Article, I propose a new strategy for states. The principle is to 
regulate contract formation, not contract enforcement. States should abandon 
contract enforcement as a policy lever—as federal arbitration law has all but 
forced this result. Instead, states should focus on deterring formation of 
contracts that would undermine state policies. This strategy leverages a 
simple fact: Arbitration requires a contract. Thus, no contract means no 
arbitration. 
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Throughout, I focus on the case of 
employment arbitration. 
Part I reviews the last fifty years of Supreme Court arbitration 
jurisprudence. The story, as I see it, is quite unsatisfying. Modern Supreme 
Court jurisprudence is primarily based not on the federal statute that governs 
arbitration (the FAA), but on a “national policy favoring arbitration.”22 The 
unsatisfying part is that this policy is a mistake—and not in the sense that it 
strikes the wrong balance. Rather, it is a mistake because it is based on an 
 
 18 On choice of law in contracts generally, see Sarath Sanga, Choice of Law: An Empirical Analysis, 
11 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 894 (2014), which analyzed all choice of law clauses in material contracts 
disclosed to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The most common choice was New York (27%), 
followed by Delaware (12%), and California (11%). Id. at 906 tbl.2. 
 19 See infra Part I (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 
 20 See infra Section I.D. 
 21 Arbitrators are not under any obligation to adopt rules to ensure fairness of process in any part of 
the proceeding. Thus, basic rules such as service of process that apply in state and federal courts (e.g., 
FED. R. CIV. P. 5) do not apply in arbitration. Further, arbitrators are not under any obligation to justify 
their awards in any way, such as by giving reasons in writing or orally. United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) (“Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to give 
their reasons for an award.”). The sole limits on arbitral process are listed in 9 U.S.C. § 10. These are 
restricted to egregious cases such as fraud, corruption, or refusal to hear evidence from one side. 
 22 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984) (“In enacting § 2 of the [FAA], Congress 
declared a national policy favoring arbitration.”). 
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erroneous citation to an early Supreme Court case, a case that all but 
expressly concludes that no such policy exists.23 
Beginning in the 1984 case of Southland Corp. v. Keating24 and 
continuing to the present, the Supreme Court leveraged this policy to both 
expand the scope of the FAA and effectively eliminate its primary 
exception.25 The primary exception, found in Section 2, provides that 
agreements to arbitrate are generally enforceable “save upon such grounds 
as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”26 Over the 
decades, the Court refined its interpretation of this so-called “saving clause,” 
systematically foreclosing nearly all plausible contract defenses. It has also 
foreclosed defenses against arbitration’s “fundamental attributes”—most 
notoriously, defenses against class waivers.27 Yet despite these profound 
limitations on contract defenses, the Court continues to insist that the Section 
2 saving clause is alive, and that arbitration provisions are still subject to 
“generally applicable contract defenses.”28 This is false.29 
These developments only have practical effect to the extent that 
contract parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. Part II presents new evidence 
on the pervasiveness of employment arbitration. I use machine-learning 
protocols to analyze the text of millions of filings with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts 
formed by public companies. These contracts cover executive employment, 
 
 23 See infra Part I (discussing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967)). 
Prima Paint expressly states that its holding, though inspired by a Second Circuit opinion that argues 
toward the existence of a “national substantive law,” was based solely on the text of the FAA. 388 U.S. 
at 399–400. 
 24 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 25 Many scholars have criticized Southland’s application of the FAA to state courts. See, e.g., IAN R. 
MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW: AGREEMENTS, AWARDS, AND REMEDIES UNDER THE 
FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT (1994); Edward Brunet, Toward Changing Models of Securities Arbitration, 
62 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1469 (1996); Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 
1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331; Stephen L. Hayford & Alan R. Palmiter, Arbitration Federalism: A State Role 
in Commercial Arbitration, 54 FLA. L. REV. 175 (2002); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism 
Mistakes in Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5 (2004). For a summary of this literature, see Christopher R. Drahozal, Federal 
Arbitration Act Preemption, 79 IND. L.J. 393, 400 n.57 (2004). For a notable exception to this wave of 
criticism, see Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101 (2002). 
 26 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 27 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018) (finding that an agreement to arbitrate 
employment disputes individually does not bar employees from engaging in “concerted activities” and 
therefore does not violate the National Labor Relations Act); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 
563 U.S. 333, 341–44 (2011) (holding that Section 2 preempts California’s Discover Bank test, under 
which class action waivers in consumer contracts are unconscionable). 
 28 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339. 
 29 See infra Section I.C. 
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credit agreements, joint ventures, purchases, and others. I show that 
employment contracts are by far the most likely to include a mandatory 
arbitration provision, and further that the difference between employment 
contracts and all others has been stable for the last twenty years. The data 
confirm what most have suspected: Employment arbitration is pervasive and 
here to stay. 
Finally, Part III offers a new strategy to states for regulating 
employment arbitration. The question is, How can states enforce mandatory 
laws in contract actions when federal arbitration policy enables employers to 
opt out? The answer is simple: They cannot. Therefore, states should not rely 
on contract enforcement (or nonenforcement) to advance public policy. 
Instead, they should deter parties from forming contracts that would 
undermine state policy. 
I offer two examples of how states can deploy this strategy. The first 
comes from employment covenants not to compete. Some states void post-
employment covenants not to compete, but parties circumvent this by 
agreeing to arbitrate disputes under a more permissive law (as in Nitro-Lift, 
above). But instead of merely voiding noncompetes, states should offer 
employees whistleblower rewards (financed by employers) for notifying 
state authorities that their employer subjects employees to noncompetes.30 
The employee may demonstrate this, for example, by showing that their own 
employment contract includes a noncompete. This policy would discourage 
employers and employees from forming, performing, or arbitrating 
noncompetes. Crucially, this policy would not be preempted by federal 
arbitration law because it does not regulate (let alone prohibit) arbitration. 
The second example comes from the arbitration of civil rights claims. 
States and the public have an interest in ensuring certain procedural 
protections for employees pursuing these claims. Confidentiality in 
arbitration proceedings prevents a state from knowing whether these 
protections are in fact provided, or indeed whether civil rights are 
meaningfully enforced. Federal law would preempt any direct effort by states 
to prevent arbitration of any class of disputes. The strategy, therefore, is not 
to prohibit arbitration but instead to incentivize employers to give employees 
the option to litigate or arbitrate. States can do this by adopting an 
overinclusive policy: a blanket prohibition on civil rights as a subject matter 
for employment contracts. The prohibition could alternatively be for specific 
classes of civil rights disputes, such as sexual harassment claims. A subject 
 
 30 In response to Concepcion (under which courts must enforce class action waivers), Professor Janet 
Alexander similarly argues that states can use qui tam actions to effectively recreate small-claims class 
actions. Janet Cooper Alexander, To Skin a Cat: Qui Tam Actions as a State Legislative Response to 
Concepcion, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1203 (2013). 
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matter prohibition, when again coupled with whistleblower rewards, can be 
structured to effectively grant employees the option to proceed (or not) to 
arbitration after a dispute arises. 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing what this Article does and does not do. 
This Article does not argue in favor of or against arbitration per se as a 
dispute resolution system. Indeed, it does not even summarize the usual 
arguments. These arguments, as well as the relative merits of each state’s 
policies, are orthogonal to the objectives of this Article. Rather, the objective 
of this Article is to diagnose a fundamental problem in contract 
enforcement—and then to offer one solution. The problem is that federal 
arbitration law prevents a state from ensuring that its laws are enforced in 
contract actions. The solution is that states should forget about contract 
enforcement and shift their focus to deterring contract formation. 
I. HOW STATES LOST CONTROL OVER CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT 
In this Part, I begin by showing how U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
immunized agreements to arbitrate from virtually all plausible contract 
defenses. I identify the origins of the Supreme Court’s “national policy 
favoring arbitration,” which forms the basis of most modern FAA cases. I 
then briefly consider the Court’s treatment of the enforceability of arbitration 
awards. I conclude by identifying a possible limiting principle to the 
otherwise seemingly unlimited ability of private parties to use arbitration to 
evade mandatory state law. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Position 
It is self-evident that the Federal Arbitration Act provides some 
circumstances under which a court may refuse to enforce an arbitration 
agreement. This is because Section 2 provides that, in almost31 all contracts 
“involving commerce,” a written agreement to arbitrate “shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in 
equity for the revocation of any contract.”32 
The Supreme Court seemingly agrees. On several occasions, it has held 
that arbitration provisions are subject to standard contract defenses raised by 
private parties. Under the saving clause of Section 2, it claims, “generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, 
may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements.”33 The Court has also 
 
 31 See 9 U.S.C. § 1 (providing exceptions). 
 32 Id. § 2. 
 33 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 686–87 (1996) (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix 
Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 
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assured state lawmakers that the saving clause “gives States a method for 
protecting consumers against unfair pressure to agree to a contract with an 
unwanted arbitration provision.”34 Moreover, it permits states to “regulate 
contracts, including arbitration clauses, under general contract law 
principles.”35 
But this is false. The Supreme Court says one thing when it has in fact 
done another. Over the last fifty years, the Court has foreclosed nearly every 
plausible circumstance under which private parties may raise a “generally 
applicable contract defense[]”36 or states “may regulate . . . arbitration 
clauses.”37 Simply put, the saving clause of Section 2 has no bite. The rest of 
this Part investigates this claim in detail. 
B. The “National Policy Favoring Arbitration” 
1. Dubious Origins 
The core of the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence lies not in 
the federal statute, but in the “national policy favoring arbitration.”38 This 
policy is cited as a foundational basis for nearly every FAA decision since 
the mid-1980s.39 But what is this policy? And where does it come from? 
The Court’s first reference to the policy—or rather its first reference to 
the idea that it exists—appeared in 1967 in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Manufacturing Co.,40 forty years after the enactment of the FAA.41 
The plaintiff, Prima Paint, had purchased Flood & Conklin’s (F&C’s) paint 
 
477, 483–84 (1989); and Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 226 (1987)); see also 
Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987). 
 34 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687. 
 37 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., 513 U.S. at 281. After surveying the case law and how it would apply 
to the most common contract defenses in Section I.C, I identify only one plausible contract defense that, 
if applied to one specific circumstance, might trigger the saving clause: A actually knows that B would 
never agree to arbitrate; A tells B that the contract does not include an arbitration provision (when in fact 
A knows that it does); B, relying on this misrepresentation, manifests assent. This is not a meaningful 
limitation because it does not stop parties from intentionally escaping mandatory contract law. See below. 
 38 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 39 See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 17 (2012); Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 
346, 353 (2008) (quoting Southland, 465 U.S. at 10). The Supreme Court’s deferential approach to 
arbitration predates the FAA. As early as 1854, it asserted that, when reviewing arbitral awards, “[e]very 
presumption is in favor of the validity of the award” and that a court required more than mere error in 
fact or law, but an egregious procedural misconduct “such as corruption in the arbitrator, or gross 
mistake.” Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349–51 (1854). 
 40 388 U.S. 395 (1967). 
 41 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–
14 (2012)), available at http://legisworks.org/sal/43/stats/STATUTE-43-Pg883.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
THJ2-NV48]. 
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business and customer lists.42 It also secured ongoing consulting services 
from F&C, along with a promise that F&C not compete with Prima Paint in 
the painting business.43 However, one week after making this promise, and 
to the surprise of Prima Paint, F&C filed for bankruptcy.44 Thus, Prima Paint 
would obtain F&C’s business and customer lists, but not its consulting 
services.45 Worst of all, F&C’s promise not to compete turned out to be 
worthless, as there was now no F&C to speak of.46 
Prima Paint filed suit for fraud in the inducement, claiming that F&C 
had knowingly misrepresented its financial position so that it could “sell” the 
worthless noncompete and consulting retainer.47 F&C moved to compel 
arbitration under its contract’s broad arbitration provision.48 The issue before 
the U.S. Supreme Court was whether a claim for fraud in the inducement 
must be sent to the arbitrator. 49 
The majority concluded yes: the FAA, it reasoned, provides the 
“explicit answer.”50 Section 4 provides that a court shall compel arbitration 
“upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is 
not in issue.”51 In this case, plaintiff’s claim was for fraud in the inducement 
of the contract as a whole—not for fraud in the inducement of the agreement 
to arbitrate specifically.52 Therefore, as far as the Court was concerned, the 
“making of the agreement for arbitration” was not at issue, and the Court 
sent the case to an arbitrator.53 Under this reasoning, any formation defense 
concerning the contract as a whole must be sent to an arbitrator. 
The problem with this reasoning is that fraudulent inducement of the 
contract could imply fraudulent inducement of each of its provisions. Section 
4 is therefore ambiguous at best. It does not provide an “explicit answer.”54 
It only compels another question: whether fraud in the whole implies fraud 
in each part. Nevertheless, the Court admitted no such ambiguity and held 
that a claim for fraud in the inducement must be sent to an arbitrator. 
 
 42 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 397.  
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. at 398. 
 45 See id. 
 46 See id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 399. 
 49 Id. at 396–97. 
 50 Id. at 403. 
 51 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). 
 52 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 402. 
 53 Id. at 403–04, 406–07. 
 54 Id. at 403. 
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Prima Paint wiped out an entire class of circumstances under which a 
court could cite the saving clause of Section 2 to refuse to enforce an 
arbitration agreement. Logically, we may partition all such circumstances 
into two classes of cases: (1) cases in which there are “grounds . . . at law or 
in equity”55 to revoke the entire contract and (2) cases in which there are 
“grounds . . . at law or in equity” to revoke the arbitration provision 
specifically. Prima Paint rules out the first. 
The Prima Paint majority does not mention any national arbitration 
policy, let alone one that could favor or disfavor arbitration. For that, we 
must turn to the dissent. 
Justice Hugo Black’s dissent took issue with much of the majority’s 
opinion. His principal criticism56 concerned the majority’s express reliance 
on the Second Circuit’s decision in Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire 
Fabrics, Inc.57 Ten years prior, Robert Lawrence had reached a similar 
conclusion, that formation of an agreement to arbitrate is, for the purposes 
of Section 2 of the FAA, treated separately from formation of the contract.58 
This has since been dubbed the “separability rule.”59 
What the Prima Paint majority failed to mention, argued Justice Black, 
was that Robert Lawrence was not decided on the basis of Section 4.60 Rather, 
the Second Circuit based its opinion on “a reasonably clear legislative intent 
to create a new body of substantive law relative to arbitration agreements,”61 
one that “encompasses questions of interpretation and construction as well 
as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability of arbitration 
agreements affecting interstate commerce or maritime affairs.”62 
But the intervening juggernaut of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,63 
decided after the FAA but before Robert Lawrence, should have compelled 
the Second Circuit to reach the opposite conclusion.64 Erie would require the 
Second Circuit to apply New York law. At the time, New York law did not 
 
 55 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 56 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 421–22 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 57 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). 
 58 Id. at 409–10. 
 59 STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION § 2.24 (2001). For critiques of the 
separability rule, see Richard C. Reuben, First Options, Consent to Arbitration, and the Demise of 
Separability: Restoring Access to Justice for Contracts with Arbitration Provisions, 56 SMU L. REV. 819, 
841–48 (2003). 
 60 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 61 Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 404. 
 62 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 421 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d 
at 409). 
 63 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 64 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 424–25 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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recognize any “separability rule.” On the contrary, “[u]nder New York 
law . . . general allegations of fraud in the inducement would . . . put in issue 
the making of the arbitration clause,” thereby failing Section 4’s condition 
and permitting a court to refuse to compel arbitration.65 The Second Circuit 
in Robert Lawrence ignored this; contravening Erie and New York law, it 
fashioned the separability rule as a doctrine within the new “body of federal 
substantive law.”66 It did so, wrote Justice Black, “not because § 4 provided 
this rule as an ‘explicit answer,’ not because [it] looked to the intention of 
the parties, but because of [its] notion that the separability rule would further 
a ‘liberal policy of promoting arbitration.’”67 This statement—Justice 
Black’s quotation of the Second Circuit’s appeal to a “liberal policy of 
promoting arbitration”—is the first instance in which the Supreme Court 
references the idea that there exists a policy favoring arbitration. 
Justice Black had argued in dissent that no such policy exists, but 
Robert Lawrence was adamant that it did. Robert Lawrence insisted that such 
a policy had been “consistently reiterated by the federal courts.”68 To support 
this assertion, Robert Lawrence cited several cases from the Second and 
Eighth Circuits.69 It also cited an early FAA decision of the Supreme Court, 
Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Service Corp.,70 which 
upheld a motion to stay proceedings pending arbitration. But this last citation 
is inapposite. Shanferoke is a straightforward application of the FAA. It 
neither refers to nor hints at a latent national policy, nor does it offer guidance 
on interpreting the FAA. 
In any event, here in the dissent to Prima Paint lie the dubious origins 
of the national policy favoring arbitration—dubious because even the 
majority dismisses it. Though the Prima Paint majority expressly endorses 
Robert Lawrence’s holding, it also expressly disavows its rationale,71 instead 
 
 65 Id. at 421. 
 66 Id. at 422. 
 67 Id. at 421. According to the Second Circuit, “doubts as to the construction of the [FAA] ought to 
be resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration.” Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 
410. 
 68 Robert Lawrence Co., 271 F.2d at 410. 
 69 Signal-Stat Corp. v. Local 475, United Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers of Am., 235 F.2d 298 (2d 
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 911 (1957); Kulukundis Shipping Co., S/A v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 
126 F.2d 978 (2d Cir. 1942); Wabash R. Co. v. Am. Refrigerator Transit Co., 7 F.2d 335, 351 (8th Cir. 
1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 643 (1926). 
 70 293 U.S. 449 (1935). 
 71 The majority noted that under Robert Lawrence, 
a claim of fraud in the inducement of the contract generally—as opposed to the arbitration clause 
itself—is for the arbitrators and not for the courts; and that this rule—one of “national substantive 
law”—governs even in the face of a contrary state rule. We agree, albeit for somewhat different 
reasons, and we affirm the decision below. 
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choosing to ground its holding in the text of the FAA.72 Thus, the Supreme 
Court’s original position on the existence and implications of a “national 
policy favoring arbitration” was either “no comment” (per the majority) or 
“nonexistent” (per the dissent). 
But the Supreme Court would later see things differently. Fifteen years 
after Prima Paint, the Court made its second reference to the “national 
policy”—and on very different terms. We find this reference in Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.,73 an abstention 
case that only tangentially implicates the FAA. In Moses, the Court remarked 
in dicta that Prima Paint established that “Section 2 is a congressional 
declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary.”74 
This is wrong.75 The “liberal federal policy” language comes from the 
dissent. The Prima Paint majority expressly disavows such arguments.76 In 
fact, in its sole reference to any policy, purpose, or congressional intent, the 
Prima Paint majority conveys the opposite sentiment: “[T]he purpose of [the 
FAA],” it wrote, “was to make arbitration agreements as enforceable as other 
contracts, but not more so.”77 It further expressly states that it does not rely 
on Robert Lawrence’s reasoning on the policy goals of the FAA, and that its 
holding is based only on the “plain meaning”78 interpretation of Sections 3 
and 4.79 
 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967) (footnote omitted). 
 72 See id. (“We agree [with the decision below], albeit for somewhat different reasons, and we affirm 
the decision below.”) (emphasis added). 
 73 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 74 Id. at 24. It further noted that “[t]he effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive 
law of arbitrability” and that “any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an 
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability.” Id. at 24–25. 
 75 Previous scholarship on Moses has remarked that “[t]he so-called policy favoring arbitration 
appears to be one created by the judiciary out of whole cloth.” Margaret L. Moses, Statutory 
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by 
Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 123 (2006). I, however, attribute its creation to an embarrassing 
error on the part of the Moses court: the Moses court must have read the Prima Paint dissent’s discussion 
of Robert Lawrence and mistaken it for the Prima Paint majority’s own reasoning. See below. 
 76 See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 399–400. 
 77 Id. at 404 n.12; see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1645 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (quoting the same). On this point, the dissent agreed: “The avowed purpose of the Act was to 
place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’” Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 
423 (Black, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)). 
 78 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404. 
 79 Id. at 399–400 (agreeing with the outcome of Robert Lawrence, but for different reasons); id. at 
403–04 (interpreting Section 4). 
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The Moses court made an embarrassing mistake. It must have read 
Justice Black’s critique of Robert Lawrence and then mistakenly presumed 
he was critiquing the Prima Paint majority. Then again, the Moses dicta was 
just that—dicta. It had no bearing on the case at hand. It might have been 
forgotten. 
2. Expansion to State Court 
Moses was not forgotten. The third and most consequential reference to 
the national policy is found in the 1984 case of Southland Corp. v. Keating.80 
The majority would base its entire argument on a citation to the national 
policy statement from Moses. This case would also mark the beginning of 
the end of mandatory contract law. 
Southland issued two holdings, one general, the other specific. The 
general holding is that the FAA applies not just in federal court but also in 
state court.81 The specific holding is that the saving clause did not apply to 
the arbitration provision at issue.82 The specific holding, and particularly the 
process by which it was reached, is what marks the beginning of the end of 
mandatory contract law. Yet the specific holding is also the least 
remembered. Indeed, neither the majority nor the dissent paid any attention 
to it. I next consider each holding in turn. 
Southland originated in state court, and so the threshold question was 
whether the FAA applied.83 First, consider Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s 
answer. Writing in dissent, Justice O’Connor argued that the FAA’s direct 
references to federal courts, along with the conspicuous absence of any 
reference to state courts, were sufficient to conclude that the FAA applied 
only in the former.84 Section 4 provides that a party aggrieved by another’s 
refusal to arbitrate “may petition any United States district court . . . for an 
order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in 
such agreement.”85 
Section 3 further provides that 
[i]f any suit or proceeding be brought in any of the courts of the United States 
upon any issue referable to arbitration . . . the court . . . shall on application of 
 
 80 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984). 
 81 Id. at 14–15. 
 82 Id. at 15 (“[I]t is clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a 
federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable.”). 
 83 If it did, then two subsequent questions would emerge: Did Section 2 oblige the state court to 
enforce the arbitration provision at issue? And did Section 4 further oblige the state court to specifically 
enforce the arbitration provision at issue? These questions were never directly posed by the Court. Instead, 
the Court declared that the answers to these questions were “clear beyond question.” Id.  
 84 Id. at 22–23 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 85 Id. at 22 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). 
113:1121 (2019) A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration 
1135 
one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had 
in accordance with the terms of the agreement.86 
In Justice O’Connor’s view, this was sufficient to hold that the FAA applies 
only in federal court. The reasoning, it would seem, is self-evident. The 
statute does not say “court” or “any court.” It says “United States district 
court.” For Justice O’Connor, this was as plain as plain meaning could be.87 
But the majority held otherwise. The majority did not address or even 
acknowledge the references to “United States courts” in Sections 3 and 4. 
The sole basis for its opinion is a citation to Moses for the proposition that 
“[i]n enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy 
favoring arbitration.”88 This policy, it held, was sufficient to conclude that 
the FAA—in its entirety—applies to state courts.89 Thus, what began as an 
embarrassing mistake in Moses became the foundation for the Court’s 
arbitration jurisprudence. 
3. States Strike Back 
Southland is the watershed arbitration case. It expanded the FAA’s 
jurisdictional scope—and therefore the extent to which parties could 
specifically enforce an arbitration provision. Before Southland, a contract 
needed an independent jurisdictional hook to make it into federal court and 
trigger the application of the FAA’s specific performance remedy. Typically, 
the hook was diversity.90 An arbitration provision, by itself, was not—and 
 
 86 Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 3). 
 87 Id. at 29. Justice O’Connor also cites Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 30. For example, the holding 
in Prima Paint expressly applied to federal courts. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 
388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967) (“We hold, therefore, that in passing upon a [Section 3] application for a stay 
while the parties arbitrate, a federal court may consider only issues relating to the making and 
performance of the agreement to arbitrate.” (emphasis added)). 
 88 Southland, 465 U.S. at 10 (majority opinion). 
 89 Id. The majority also offered a quasi-textual (and nonsensical) argument: Congress could have 
directed federal courts to specifically enforce all arbitration provisions, not just those in contracts 
“involving commerce.” Because Congress limited the Act to contracts within the reach of the Commerce 
Clause, it must have intended the Act to apply in both federal and state courts. Id. at 15. This is nonsense 
because Congress could have intended both. That is, Congress could have intended the Act to apply only 
to contracts that (1) are litigated in federal courts and (2) involve commerce. Justice Thomas similarly 
observed that the Section 2 argument was, in his words, the Southland majority’s only “real response” to 
Sections 3 and 4 of the statute. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 292 (1995). 
Yet Congress might well have thought that even if it could have called upon federal courts to 
enforce arbitration agreements in every single case that came before them, there was no federal 
interest in doing so unless interstate commerce or maritime transactions were involved. This 
conclusion is far more plausible. 
Id. Indeed, there would be no federal interest in disturbing the jurisdiction of state courts over 
noncommercial contracts, such as agreements under family law. 
 90 Until 2009, it was not clear whether a court may alternatively rely on the federal nature of the 
underlying dispute as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction. In Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 53 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
1136 
still is not—sufficient grounds for federal subject matter jurisdiction.91 After 
Southland, no such hook was needed. Specific performance was now 
available in state court. Parties to any contract “involving commerce” could 
now specifically enforce a valid arbitration provision. 
Southland is also a turning point for the Supreme Court’s docket. 
Table 1 shows that the volume of its arbitration cases increased significantly, 
while Figure 1 shows that arbitration-related disputes continue to consume 
an ever-increasing share of the Court’s caseload.92 
Some of these cases were pushback, if not outright rebellion, by state 
supreme courts. These cases pushed back against the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
ever-expanding theory of the scope of FAA preemption. Some states simply 
ignored unambiguous U.S. Supreme Court precedent.93 Other states were 
openly hostile. Southland, wrote one state supreme court justice, 
“bludgeoned the [FAA] . . . . If the liberties in statutory construction taken 
by the Supreme Court in Southland hint at the horizons of American 
jurisprudence, I shudder to think what atrocities might follow.”94 Southland’s 
reasoning, wrote another state supreme court justice, was “tendentious,” 
 
(2009), the Supreme Court decided that it could; see also Imre S. Szalai, The Federal Arbitration Act and 
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV 319, 343–47 (2007) (analyzing 
arguments for and against such a basis). 
 91 Section 4 provides that 
[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written 
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court which, save for such 
agreement, would have jurisdiction under title 28 . . . for an order directing that such arbitration 
proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement. 
9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (emphasis added). Southland did not change this. Southland, 465 U.S. at 15 n.9; see 
also id. at 24. 
 92 The data come from the Supreme Court Database. See Harold J. Spaeth et al., 2017 Supreme Court 
Database, Version 2017 Release 01, http://supremecourtdatabase.org [https://perma.cc/UD9P-8G5G]. A 
case is defined as “arbitration-related” if the database identifies its sole issue as “arbitration.” 
Qualitatively similar results are obtained if one also counts cases for which “arbitration” is one of the 
case’s many issues. 
 93 For example, in one case from Alabama, the state court reversed a motion to compel arbitration 
on the rationale that debt contracts did not fall under the Commerce Clause. Alafabco, Inc. v. Citizens 
Bank, 872 So. 2d 798, 808 (Ala. 2002), rev’d, 539 U.S. 52 (2003). In another case from Florida, KPMG 
LLP v. Cocchi, 51 So. 3d 1165, 1168 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), vacated, 565 U.S. 18 (2011), the state 
court held that when a contract includes both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims, the FAA permits courts 
to refuse to compel arbitration of any claim. This directly violated a categorical rule issued by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 244 (1985) (requiring a court to 
compel arbitration of the arbitrable claims). 
 94 Ex parte Ala. Oxygen Co., 452 So. 2d 860, 861 (Ala. 1984) (Embry, J., dissenting). In the same 
Term that Southland was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated an Alabama Supreme Court decision 
that directly conflicted with its holding. York Int’l v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 465 U.S. 1016 (1984). On remand, 
the Alabama Supreme Court duly reversed its own holding. Ex parte Ala. Oxygen Co., 452 So. 2d at 861. 
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“created from whole cloth,” and “[c]ontrary to the intended purpose of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.”95 
In reply to these and other state court mutinies, the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued its own set of return volleys: “The Supreme Court of Appeals of West 
Virginia . . . misrea[d] and disregard[ed] the precedents of this Court.”96 
“The Supreme Court of Alabama was . . . misguided.”97 Similar rebukes can 
be found against Oklahoma98 and Montana.99 These rebukes quelled some 
states, while further emboldening others, including both state courts100 and 
state legislatures.101 
TABLE 1: U.S. SUPREME COURT CASELOAD 




Percent of total cases that 
are arbitration-related 
0.08% 0.55% 
Years 1946–1983 1985–2016 
Source: SUPREME COURT DATABASE. 
 
 
 95 Brown ex rel. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 724 S.E.2d 250, 278–79 (W. Va. 2011), vacated 
sub nom. Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. 530 (2012). 
 96 Marmet Health Care Ctr., 565 U.S. at 531. 
 97 Citizens Bank v. Alafabco, Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 56 (2003). 
 98 Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 20 (2012) (“The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s 
decision disregards this Court’s precedents on the FAA.”). 
 99 Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). 
 100 Montana, for instance, continues to ignore U.S. Supreme Court precedent in its arbitration 
decisions. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 494 (Mont. 2009) (invalidating all arbitration 
provisions in contracts of adhesion if they are outside a party’s reasonable expectations). 
 101 Even after Southland (and perhaps because of it), many states enacted laws regulating arbitration. 
Some states continue to maintain laws that would clearly be preempted under Supreme Court precedent. 
Georgia, for example, requires that employees specifically initial the arbitration clause. GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 9-9-2(c)(9) (2018). California prohibits arbitration for claims of unpaid wages. CAL. LAB. CODE § 229 
(West 2018). A Kentucky law mirroring the FAA previously excluded all employment agreements. KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 417.050 (West 2018). But this was preempted by Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
532 U.S. 105 (2001). See In re Transp. Assocs., Inc., 263 B.R. 531, 533–34 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2001); see 
also MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-5-114 (2017) (requiring arbitration agreements to be on the first page of a 
contract) (preempted in Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 681, and section (4) was subsequently repealed); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-48-10 (2018) (similar). 
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FIGURE 1: ARBITRATION-RELATED CASELOAD OVER TIME 
C. The End of Contract Defenses 
1. The Key Move 
Southland’s general holding—applying the FAA to state courts—has 
been roundly criticized by scholars.102 But it is its second holding that has led 
to the unraveling of mandatory contract law. 
The second holding tacitly placed a new limit on the saving clause of 
Section 2. Recall that Prima Paint rules out cases for which there exist 
“grounds . . . at law or in equity”103 to revoke the entire contract. Thus, even 
before Southland, a court could refuse to enforce an agreement to arbitrate 
only if there were “grounds . . . at law or in equity” to revoke the arbitration 
provision specifically. 
The arbitration provision at issue in Southland came from the standard 
franchise agreement of Southland Corporation (the erstwhile corporate name 
of 7-Eleven). The California Supreme Court, construing a section of the 
California Franchise Investment Law,104 held that Southland’s arbitration 
provision was unenforceable as a matter of public policy. It reasoned that a 
U.S. Supreme Court case from thirty years prior, Wilko v. Swan,105 compelled 
this conclusion because Wilko had similarly construed an identically worded 
 
 102 See supra note 25. 
 103 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 104 See CAL. CORP. CODE § 31512 (2018) (“Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any provision of this law or any rule 
or order hereunder is void.”). 
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federal statute.106 Thus, to specifically enforce the arbitration provision, the 
Southland majority’s opinion needed not only to hold that the FAA applies 
in state court but also that it preempts the California Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of its statute as “grounds as exist at law or in equity” upon 
which to refuse enforcement.107 
The Court so held. The body of the majority opinion provides no reason 
for this holding.108 But a final footnote offers a hint: 
[A] party may assert general contract defenses such as fraud to avoid 
enforcement of an arbitration agreement. We conclude, however, that the 
defense to arbitration found in the California Franchise Investment Law is not 
a ground that exists at law or in equity “for the revocation of any contract” but 
merely a ground that exists for the revocation of arbitration provisions in 
contracts subject to the California Franchise Investment Law.109 
The idea, it seems, is that state law cannot single out arbitration. The 
Supreme Court slowly refined this idea over time. The first refinement 
appeared in Perry v. Thomas110: 
[S]tate law, whether of legislative or judicial origin, is applicable [to the saving 
clause] if that law arose to govern issues concerning the validity, revocability, 
and enforceability of contracts generally. . . . [A] court [may not] rely on the 
uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law holding . . . .111 
The idea then crystalized in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion112: “[The] 
saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by generally 
applicable contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, but 
not by defenses that apply only to arbitration or that derive their meaning 
from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is at issue.”113 The now-familiar 
refrain has appeared most recently in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis: “[T]he 
saving clause recognizes only defenses that apply to ‘any’ contract. In this 
 
 106 See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (2012). Four years after Southland, Wilko was 
overruled. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp. Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 107 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 108 In its sole reference to the second issue, the Court wrote only that “it is clear beyond question that 
if this suit had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would 
have been enforceable.” Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 (1984). The dissent, for its part, did 
not mention the Court’s second holding. 
 109 Southland, 465 U.S. at 16 n.11 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2). 
 110 482 U.S. 483 (1987). 
 111 Id. at 493 n.9 (emphasis omitted). 
 112 563 U.S. 333 (2011); see also Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703 (2012) (analyzing the implications of Concepcion). 
 113 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (emphasis added) (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 
517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)) (quotations omitted). 
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way the clause establishes a sort of ‘equal-treatment’ rule for arbitration 
contracts.”114 
If one were to take these statements at face value, one might conclude 
that the Supreme Court has in fact adopted a position of neutrality or “equal 
treatment” with respect to arbitration. But while the logic of “general 
applicability” sounds neutral in theory, in practice it is not. 
The problem is that when the Supreme Court applies this idea to actual 
cases, it mischaracterizes the nature of a “generally applicable” contract 
defense. What makes a contract defense “generally applicable”? The answer 
is not that, when applied, the argument advancing the defense eschews 
specificity or merely calls upon some general proposition like “pacta sunt 
servanda” (agreements must be kept). “General propositions do not decide 
concrete cases.”115 There is no such thing as a “general” contract argument. 
Rather, what makes a defense generally applicable is that the style of 
argument could apply to a diversity of exchanges. When applied to an actual 
case, a general defense necessarily derives its meaning from specific facts of 
that exchange. To argue a general defense such as unconscionability or fraud, 
one must attack a specific provision of the agreement, or a specific 
representation of one party, or a specific belief of one party, or a specific fact 
of the world—or some combination thereof. Thus, a generally applicable 
defense, while general in theory, is necessarily specific in application. 
The Supreme Court’s key move—the one that quietly annihilates a 
whole class of potential defenses—is that it characterizes a “generally 
applicable” defense as one that does not “derive [its] meaning from” a 
specific fact of arbitration. The move here is not to foreclose any contract 
defense. Instead, the move is to foreclose the application of any contract 
defense. 
Consider two examples. Suppose one person compliments another’s 
dancing performance. There is nothing inherently fraudulent about this 
specific fact. If, however, the compliment were disingenuous and made only 
to induce the receiver to purchase more dance lessons, then this compliment 
may become fraudulent within the context of that exchange.116 Similarly, 
suppose one party pays another $450 in exchange for a promise to either 
perform some task or return the money. The promise to return the money is 
 
 114 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018) (quoting Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 
1421, 1426 (2017)). 
 115 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 116 See Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (holding that the 
defendant’s statements misrepresenting the plaintiff’s dancing abilities were actionable because the 
compliments induced the plaintiff to purchase more dance lessons); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS §§ 168–69 (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (discussing when it is reasonable to rely on an assertion 
of opinion). 
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enforceable—at least generally and in the abstract. But if the payment were 
a bribe in exchange for a political favor, then this otherwise innocuous 
promise to repay becomes unenforceable as a matter of public policy.117 
The lesson of these two examples is simple. Terms or features of the 
bargaining process that are innocuous in isolation (such as compliments or 
promises to repay) may, within the context of a specific exchange, become 
fraudulent, or unconscionable, or against public policy. 
The same applies to arbitration. Like a gratuitous compliment or a 
simple promise to repay, there is nothing inherently fraudulent or 
unconscionable about arbitration. In the context of a specific exchange, 
however, an otherwise innocuous arbitration provision may, like a 
compliment or promise to repay, become unconscionable or fraudulent.118 
Imagine what would happen if the same limit that the Supreme Court 
applies to arbitration provisions were applied to the two examples above. 
That is, imagine that a party may raise a “generally applicable contract 
defense”—but only if the defense does not “derive its meaning” from the fact 
that either (1) a compliment or (2) a promise to repay is at issue. How could 
either case be argued? How could the victim of a fraudulently induced 
dancing lesson actually apply the formation defense of fraud in the 
inducement without reference to the compliment? She could not. Or how 
could a court refuse to enforce the bribery contract if federal law barred a 
public policy defense from “deriv[ing] its meaning” from the fact that a 
promise to repay is at issue? It could not. Thus, the Court’s key move—
foreclosing defenses that, when applied, reference any element of 
arbitration—prevents parties from applying “generally applicable” defenses. 
 
 117 See Sinnar v. Le Roy, 270 P.2d 800 (1954) (finding a contract void for illegality because it 
violated state laws about liquor licenses). 
 118 For example, in Ferguson v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 298 F.3d 778, 782–87 (9th Cir. 
2002), the Ninth Circuit held that an employment contract’s arbitration provision was unconscionable 
because supplemental provisions on fee shifting and the number of allowable depositions 
disproportionately impacted the employee. 
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This limitation can be (and is) used to shut down common contract defenses, 
such as mistake,119 capacity,120 and duress.121 
It would be a mistake to interpret the Court’s neutral language as 
advancing neutral policy, one that merely treats arbitration provisions like 
any other, or, as the Southland court put it, one that honors the “congressional 
intent to place arbitration agreements ‘upon the same footing as other 
contracts.’”122 Under Prima Paint, a court may only decide “issues relating 
 
 119 See, e.g., Masco Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 630 (6th Cir. 2004) (a claim for 
mutual mistake must be resolved by the arbitrator). It is not possible to mount a defense premised on 
mistake. A party would have to show not only that the nonexistence of the arbitration provision was a 
basic assumption upon which the contract was made but also that enforcing the arbitration provision 
would either (a) materially adversely affect her (if the mistake were mutual) or (b) lead to an 
“unconscionable” result (if the mistake were unilateral). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 
§§ 152–54. Neither defense is permissible because it would require a specific holding that compelling 
arbitration would, in fact, materially adversely affect one of the parties, and therefore that the arbitral 
forum itself is somehow inadequate. Again, such a holding would necessarily “single out” features of the 
arbitral process. The Supreme Court has prohibited such reasoning. Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S.Ct. at 
1428 n.2. 
 120 A circuit split has emerged on whether the court or the arbitrator should resolve a dispute when 
one party raises a capacity defense. Compare Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Brown, 304 F.3d 469, 471 (5th 
Cir. 2002) (the issue should be resolved by the arbitrator), with Spahr v. Secco, 330 F.3d 1266, 1286 (10th 
Cir. 2003) (the issue should be resolved by the court), and Rowan v. Brookdale Senior Living Cmtys., 
2015 WL 9906264, at 4 (W.D. Mich. June 1, 2015) (same), aff’d, 647 F. App’x 607 (6th Cir. 2016). The 
Supreme Court has never heard a capacity case, but it would almost surely hold that such disputes must 
be sent to the arbitrator. Capacity applies to the formation of the contract in its entirety, not to the inclusion 
of any specific provision. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 14 (infancy), 15 
(mental illness). The Court’s rule in such instances is categorical: “[U]nless the challenge is to the 
arbitration clause itself, the issue of the contract’s validity is considered by the arbitrator in the first 
instance.” Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). For the capacity 
defense to apply only to the arbitration clause, it must be that the agreement to arbitrate was formed 
separately. That is, it must be that a capable party formed a contract without an arbitration agreement, 
subsequently became incapable, and, while incapable, modified the existing contract with the arbitration 
agreement. 
 121 This defense is implausible. A claim that the contract was formed under physical duress or 
coercion goes to formation of the contract as a whole. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 174. 
Again, this defense would be sent to the arbitrator. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 
388 U.S. 395, 400 (1967). Any other duress defense would require a showing that the aggrieved party 
assented only because of another’s “improper threat,” such as a crime or tort, and that the threat left the 
aggrieved party with “no reasonable alternative.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 175(1) 
(improper threat by the counter-party), 175(2) (improper threat by a third party), 176 (defining an 
improper threat). But the “alternative” to arbitration is the public courts. Assessing the reasonableness of 
this alternative would require a comparison of arbitration and litigation, which in turn would rely on facts 
specific to arbitration. See, e.g., Austin Instrument, Inc. v. Loral Corp., 29 N.Y.2d 124 (1971) (on 
economic duress generally). Thus, we are again left with only one contrived possibility: Two parties form 
a valid contract without an arbitration provision; then one party physically compels the other to modify it 
by including an arbitration provision. 
 122 Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15, 16 n.11 (1984) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th 
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)); see also Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 423 (Black, J., dissenting) (also quoting 
H.R. REP. NO. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924)). 
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to the making and performance of the agreement to arbitrate.”123 It must send 
any defense relating to the validity of the contract as a whole to an arbitrator. 
Yet under Southland and subsequent cases, a defense may not cite any 
specific feature of the arbitral forum or the arbitration provision at issue. 
In summary, the saving clause of Section 2 of the FAA expressly 
provides grounds for refusing to enforce an arbitration provision. But, 
according to the Supreme Court, a defense that implicates the arbitration 
provision is barred, while a defense that does not implicate the arbitration 
provision is sent to the arbitrator. The Supreme Court has Catch 22-ed the 
saving clause out of existence. 
2. The End of State Policies 
In a separate opinion to Southland, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part, Justice John Paul Stevens anticipated how eliminating the saving clause 
would affect a state’s public policy.124 Justice Stevens agreed with the 
majority on the first issue: even if Congress intended that the FAA apply 
only in federal courts, “intervening developments in the law”—presumably, 
Supreme Court precedent—required the Court to hold that the FAA applies 
equally in state courts.125 However, Justice Stevens was alarmed by the 
Southland majority’s second holding and its casual dismissal of the saving 
clause: 
For me it is not “clear beyond question that if this suit had been brought as a 
diversity action in a federal district court, the arbitration clause would have been 
 
 123 Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 404. An additional issue arises if the challenge is to the arbitration 
clause itself: whether the parties agreed to submit questions of arbitrability (as distinct from the 
underlying merits) to an arbitrator or to a court. On this issue, the Supreme Court has held that the default 
rule is the court. First Options v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Some scholars have argued that First 
Options introduces ambiguity into the application of the separability rule and Prima Paint. See, e.g., 
Reuben, supra note 59, at 872–78. But it does not. In First Options, the plaintiff Kaplan had concluded 
several related contracts with First Options. Some were in his own name; others were on behalf of his 
wholly owned company. Only the latter contract, however, had an arbitration provision. The arbitrability 
question was whether the former agreements were also subject to arbitration. 514 U.S. at 940–42. First 
Options was therefore the very rare case in which only the formation of the agreement to arbitrate—and 
not the formation of the agreement as a whole—was at issue. The FAA unambiguously declares that this 
issue is for the court. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (conditioning a court’s duty to specifically enforce an 
agreement to arbitrate “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in 
issue”) (emphasis added); 9 U.S.C. § 3 (conditioning a court’s duty to stay court proceedings pending 
arbitration on the same). This distinction, between the agreement to arbitration versus the agreement as a 
whole, is the logic of Prima Paint. See Prima Paint Corp., 388 U.S. at 403; see also supra Section I.B.1 
(on dubious origins). 
 124 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, Justice Thomas issued a separate concurrence that mirrors the 
concerns of Justice Stevens’s separate opinion in Southland, specifically, that the scope of preemption 
implicit in the majority’s holding is confusing and threatens to swallow the saving clause. See 563 U.S. 
333, 353, 356 (2011). 
 125 Southland, 465 U.S. at 17 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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enforceable.” The general rule prescribed by § 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act 
is that arbitration clauses in contracts involving interstate transactions are 
enforceable as a matter of federal law. That general rule, however, is subject to 
an exception based on “such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.” I believe that exception leaves room for the 
implementation of certain substantive state policies that would be undermined 
by enforcing certain categories of arbitration clauses.126 
Justice Stevens’s warning has proved apt. Even while documenting how 
agreements to arbitrate are used to undermine anti-wage-theft policies, 
consumer protections, and restrictions on employment noncompetes,127 the 
Supreme Court has used Southland to preempt a wide range of state policies 
embodied in state common law, state statutes, and state constitutions.128 
Indeed, the Court later held that even federal policies cannot trigger the 
saving clause.129 Only Justice Stevens noticed that Southland implicitly, and 
without reason, held that the FAA preempts the entire class of contract 
defenses based on public policy.130 
D. Is There Any Limit to Arbitration? 
I conclude this Part by identifying a possible limiting principle to the 
seemingly unlimited power of arbitrators. I first review the standard of 
review of arbitral awards. I then offer a potential limiting principle, based on 
a reinterpretation of “manifest disregard,” a judge-made gloss of the FAA’s 
standard of review. 
 
 126 Id. at 17–18. 
 127 See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (consumer contracting); id. at 471 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17 (2012) (covenants not to 
compete in employment agreements); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006) 
(consumer credit) and id. at 449 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (wage 
theft) and id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 128 See, e.g., Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27 (2017) (state 
constitution); AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339–41 (2011) (state common law); Doctor’s 
Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996) (state statute). 
 129 See Am. Exp. Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228 (2013). Early Supreme Court decisions 
had suggested that the saving clause might apply if enforcing an arbitration provision would prevent a 
party from “effectively . . . vindicat[ing]” a federal cause of action. Id. at 235 (citing Mitsubishi Motors 
v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 
273–74 (2009); and Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991)). But the Court shut 
this down in 2013. It reasoned that “effective vindication” of a federal claim does not require that a person 
retain the ability to pursue the federal claim; it merely requires that a person retain the right to bring the 
claim. Thus, a court may enforce an arbitration provision even if enforcement disables a party from 
actually bringing the federal claim. See Am. Express, 133 S. Ct. at 235–38 (holding that the “effective 
vindication” exception does not invalidate a class waiver, even if plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating 
the federal claim exceeds the potential recovery); see also id. at 239 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 130 Southland, 465 U.S. at 18 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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1. The Grounds for Appeal 
Two key features of arbitration enable parties to escape mandatory 
contract law: (1) arbitrator power and (2) award finality. On the first, the 
remedial powers of an arbitrator are at least as broad as those of a judge, and 
possibly more so.131 On the second, the FAA limits the grounds under which 
courts may refuse to enforce an award. These grounds are limited to extreme 
procedural defects such as “fraud, . . . evident partiality or corruption in the 
arbitrators, . . . [arbitrator] misconduct[,] . . . [and cases in which] the 
arbitrators exceeded their powers.”132 
The standard of review cannot be altered in contract and leaves no room 
to consider the merits of an award.133 Thus, an arbitrator’s award is nearly 
unappealable. Egregious errors in law or fact are not sufficient grounds for 
review.134 “Of course, decisions procured by the parties through fraud or 
through the arbitrator’s dishonesty need not be enforced,” yet “as long as the 
arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting 
within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed 
serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision.”135 
2. A Possible Limit: Reinterpreting “Manifest Disregard” 
Would any award, regardless of its substance, be enforced so long as it 
did not evidence procedural defect? A strict interpretation of both the FAA 
 
 131 The overwhelming majority of arbitration agreements provide for arbitration per the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. These rules give power to the arbitrator to “grant any remedy or relief 
that the arbitrator deems just and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the parties.” See 
Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association, R-47(a) (2013). This includes 
power to award damages, fees, specific performance and other injunctive relief, as well as power to grant 
interim or interlocutory awards. See R-47 (scope of award); R-37 (interim measures); R-38 (emergency 
measures). 
 132 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012). The FAA also provides that a court may modify an award in scrivener’s 
error-type cases such as “evident material miscalculation of figures,” or to excise a portion of an award 
“[w]here the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them.” Id. § 11. 
 133 In Hall Street v. Mattel, the Supreme Court held that FAA’s grounds for review “may [not] be 
supplemented by contract.” 552 U.S. 576, 578 (2008) (referring to Section 9). But see Maureen A. 
Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of Arbitral Awards, 
14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 929, 949–51 (2010) (analyzing the possibility for parties to draft creative 
contracts that expand court review of arbitration awards); Christopher R. Drahozal, Contracting Around 
Hall Street, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 905, 911–16 (2010) (same). The majority’s reasoning was mostly 
premised on the text of the FAA, which, it correctly notes, “carries no hint of flexibility.” Hall Street, 
552 U.S. at 587. Predictably, however, Hall Street also relied on the usual “national policy favoring 
arbitration” rationale. The statutory standard of review, it concluded, “substantiat[es] a national policy 
favoring arbitration with just the limited review needed to maintain arbitration’s essential virtue of 
resolving disputes straightaway.” Id. at 588. 
 134 Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585–86. 
 135 United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987). 
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and Supreme Court precedent compels the conclusion that, no matter how 
egregious the error in law, a court must confirm the award. 
Yet there must be some limit. At the very least, there are limits outside 
of arbitration law that would deter a party from asking a court to enforce an 
agreement to arbitrate. These include, for example, laws that attach criminal 
liability to price-fixing or human-trafficking agreements.136 Further, even if 
an arbitrator awarded damages for breach of a price-fixing or human-
trafficking scheme, it seems unlikely that any court would confirm it. This 
much seems obvious. 
But why is this obvious? Is it because there exists some limiting 
principle within the FAA or the Supreme Court’s arbitration precedent? 
Strictly speaking, I think not. 
There is, however, one doctrine—the “manifest disregard” standard—
that, though courts do not expressly declare it as such, I would reinterpret as 
a limiting principle that responds to this concern. Manifest disregard is a 
judge-made standard to review arbitration awards. The phrase comes from 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan.137 
The Second Circuit interpreted Wilko as introducing a standard for 
vacatur outside the FAA. The Second Circuit admitted that the bounds of the 
new manifest disregard standard were not well-defined,138 yet “it clearly 
means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law”139—that 
is, more than what the FAA allows. The Second Circuit eventually fashioned 
a two-prong test consisting of objective and subjective components, both of 
which must be met before a court may refuse to confirm the award.140 The 
objective prong asks “whether the governing law alleged to have been 
 
 136 See, e.g., Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1. In rare cases, some lower courts have 
refused to enforce an award on public policy grounds. See, e.g., Connecticut v. AFSCME, Council 4, 
Local 387, AFL-CIO, 747 A.2d 480 (Conn. 2000); see also Richard C. Reuben, Personal Autonomy and 
Vacatur After Hall Street, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 1103, 1113–14 (2009) (discussing such cases). Given 
the Supreme Court’s rejection of unconscionability in Concepcion and its categorical statement on the 
exclusivity of the grounds for review in Hall Street, it seems likely that, were it to review such cases, the 
Supreme Court would reverse any lower court refusing to enforce an award on nonstatutory grounds. 
 137 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled on other grounds by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Exp., 
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). As the Supreme Court later summarized: 
The Wilko Court was explaining that arbitration would undercut the Securities Act’s buyer 
protections when it remarked (citing FAA § 10) that “[p]ower to vacate an [arbitration] award is 
limited,” and went on to say that “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to 
manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in 
interpretation.” 
Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 584 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436–37) (internal citations omitted). 
 138 Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 139 Id. 
 140 Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2002). 
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ignored by the arbitrators was well defined, explicit, and clearly 
applicable.”141 The subjective prong “look[s] to the knowledge actually 
possessed by the arbitrator” and asks whether “the arbitrator appreciated the 
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decided to ignore or pay 
no attention to it.”142 
The Supreme Court, however, resisted interpreting manifest disregard 
as something more than what the FAA allows. In Hall Street v. Mattel,143 one 
of the litigants asked the Supreme Court to recognize manifest disregard as 
separate grounds for vacating awards.144 The Court declined, equating this 
with a request for “general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.”145 Yet the 
Court equivocated. It wondered aloud whether Wilko’s phrase introduced 
new grounds for review or was merely a shorthand reference to the statutory 
grounds collectively.146 
Given its categorical holding that “the statutory grounds [for vacatur] 
are exclusive,”147 some courts concluded that manifest disregard did not 
survive Hall Street.148 Others, however, arrived at the opposite conclusion, 
and the issue arose again in the 2010 case of Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds.149 
The Second Circuit had reasoned that while manifest disregard was not a 
separate, non-statutory grounds for review, it nevertheless survived Hall 
Street as a “judicial gloss” on the statutory grounds of Section 10.150 The 
Second Circuit then applied the manifest disregard “gloss” to vacate an 
arbitration award.151 
 
 141 Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, 808 F.2d at 934) (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
 142 Id. 
 143 552 U.S. 576 (2008). 
 144 Id. at 584. 
 145 Id. at 585. 
 146 Id.; see also Robert Ellis, Imperfect Minimalism: Unanswered Questions in Hall Street 
Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008), 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1187, 1191–93 
(2009) (explaining how the Supreme Court’s dicta created uncertainty among the lower courts). 
 147 552 U.S. at 578. 
 148 See, for example, the discussion in Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 
(2d Cir. 2008). 
 149 559 U.S. 662, 670 (2010). 
 150 Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94, rev’d and remanded sub nom. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds 
Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010). 
 151 The Second Circuit explained: 
Like the Seventh Circuit, we view the “manifest disregard” doctrine, and the FAA itself, as a 
mechanism to enforce the parties’ agreements to arbitrate rather than as judicial review of the 
arbitrators’ decision. We must therefore continue to bear the responsibility to vacate arbitration 
awards in the rare instances in which the arbitrator knew of the relevant legal principle, 
appreciated that this principle controlled the outcome of the disputed issue, and nonetheless 
willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it. 
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari but again avoided the manifest 
disregard question by affirming the Second Circuit decision on statutory 
grounds. It held that the arbitrator had exceeded its powers by expressly 
basing the award on its own public policy judgment (instead of on applicable 
law).152 Further, it expressly declined to decide whether manifest disregard 
survived Hall Street,153 though it did awkwardly leave the door open by 
asserting that, if the standard did apply, it would have been satisfied in this 
case.154 
I think the Stolt-Nielsen Court unintentionally but effectively 
incorporates a limiting principle into the statutory grounds for vacatur. It 
accomplished this by holding, as a matter of law, that an arbitration panel 
which imposes its own policy choice “exceeds its powers” under 
Section 10.155 In this way, Stolt-Nielsen smuggles the subjective prong of 
manifest disregard—that “the arbitrator must appreciate the existence of a 
clearly governing legal principle but decide[] to ignore or pay no attention to 
it”156—into one of the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur, namely, 
excession of powers.157 
 
Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95 (alterations omitted). The Second Circuit’s argument is flawed. Stripped to 
its essentials, it offers prudential grounds for the proposition that something akin to “willful 
misapplication of the law” should be grounds for vacating an award. This argument ignores Hall Street’s 
holding that the statutory grounds are exclusive. However, the Second Circuit’s conclusion—that 
manifest disregard survives Hall Street—could be supported. A more logically sound argument would 
support that conclusion by reasoning either (1) the statutory grounds in Section 10 collectively imply 
manifest disregard, or (2) manifest disregard is a specific instance of one of Section 10’s grounds. Indeed, 
on (2), one could argue that “willful misapplication of the law” is an instance of one of the statutory 
grounds in Section 10(4), namely, the case in which “the arbitrators . . . so imperfectly executed [their 
powers] that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.” 
9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012). 
 152 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 676–77. 
 153 Id. at 672 n.3. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 677. 
 156 Westerbeke Corp. v. Daihatsu Motor Co., 304 F.3d 200, 209 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)) (internal quotations and 
alterations omitted). 
 157 Excession of powers was traditionally equated with “exceeding the submission,” that is, the case 
in which an arbitrator decided on issues that were not properly submitted for arbitration, either because 
the parties themselves did not request an award on the issue, or because it is outside of the scope of the 
parties’ agreement to arbitrate. See, e.g., De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall) 419, 430–31 (1866). 
After the FAA, the Supreme Court held close to the understanding that excession of powers is limited to 
cases in which the arbitrator strays from the agreement. 
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the [agreement]; he does not sit to 
dispense his own brand of industrial justice. He may of course look for guidance from many 
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the [agreement]. 
When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to 
refuse enforcement of the award. 
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This limiting principle, however, has its own limits. It is based not on 
an arbitrator’s actual knowledge that the award is not based on applicable 
law, but rather on the arbitrator’s normative vision of applicable law.158 Thus, 
this principle would not apply to an arbitrator who interprets a choice of law 
provision as valid (even if a court would not) and then applies that law to 
enforce the contract. Moreover, the principle would require some record of 
the arbitrator’s reasoning—yet arbitrators are under no obligation to create 
one, or indeed provide any reason to support their award.159 
A more robust limiting principle would be based not on subjective but 
on constructive knowledge, though, to be fair, such a standard might risk 
relitigation of every award. In any event, it remains to be seen precisely how 
this limiting principle applies to cases in which there is no evidence of the 
arbitrator’s subjective beliefs or reasoning. 
E. Conclusion 
In summary, this Part chronicled the rise of federal arbitration 
preemption and the concomitant decline in states’ authority to craft and 
enforce contract law. These developments, however, have practical effect 
only to the extent that contract parties agree to arbitrate their disputes. To the 
best of my knowledge, no previous study has presented nationally 
representative figures documenting the extent to which parties agree to 
arbitrate. The next Part thus endeavors to provide such figures for the first 
time. 
II. NEW EVIDENCE ON THE PERVASIVENESS OF  
EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION 
This Part presents new evidence on the pervasiveness of employment 
arbitration. Section A describes the data collection process, and Section B 
presents the results. 
 
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960). But in Stolt-Nielsen, 
the Court seized upon the language of an arbitrator “dispens[ing] his own brand of industrial justice” in 
its holding that straying from the agreement includes, in effect, straying from the application of the law. 
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 671–72. 
 158 Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672 (“[T]he task of an arbitrator is to interpret and enforce a contract, 
not to make public policy.”). There are a handful of other, though much rarer, nonstatutory grounds upon 
which some lower courts have refused to enforce an award. See Reuben, supra note 136, at 1113–16 
(summarizing these grounds). 
 159 Both U.S. courts and the American Arbitration Association leave it to the discretion of the parties 
and the arbitrator. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 598 (“Arbitrators have no obligation 
to the court to give their reasons for an award.”); see also Commercial Arbitration Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association, R-46(b) (2013) (“The arbitrator need not render a reasoned award unless the 
parties request such an award in writing prior to appointment of the arbitrator or unless the arbitrator 
determines that a reasoned award is appropriate.”). 
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A. Data Collection 
I used standard natural language processing tools to create a dataset of 
roughly 800,000 contracts from all U.S. public companies between 1996 and 
2016. The contracts come from filings submitted to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). In general, a company must file reports to the 
SEC if it has made a public offering or has “total assets exceeding 
$10,000,000 and a class of equity security . . . held [by at least] 2,000 
persons.”160 Companies that report to the SEC must disclose any “contract 
not made in the ordinary course of business which is material to the 
[company].”161 This includes, among others, contracts to which directors and 
officers are parties.162 Companies report material contracts by attaching them 
as exhibits to filings submitted to the SEC, such as on the periodic and 
interim reports submitted through forms 10-K, 10-Q, and 8-K.163 The SEC 
makes all filings since 1996 available online on the EDGAR database.164 
To recover the contracts, I wrote a program to search through all SEC 
filings. SEC filings use a unique code to identify material contracts.165 Thus, 
this process recovered every contract disclosed to the SEC since 1996. I then 
parsed each contract for several variables: contract type, arbitration 
provision, and choice of law. The sample only includes contracts that are 
governed by the law of a U.S. state. Also, in the table below, I report the 
results for arbitration rates separately for the fifteen most common contract 
categories. These include fourteen distinct categories and a fifteenth category 
for “other.” 
 
 160 Securities Exchange Act § 12(g); 15 U.S.C. § 78(l) (2012). 
 161 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(10) (2018). Any “material contract or plan of acquisition, reorganization, 
arrangement, liquidation or succession . . . [must] be filed as an exhibit to the Form 10-Q or Form 10-K.” 
17 § C.F.R. 229.601(a)(4). In response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 409, 15 U.S.C. § 78(m) (2012), 
which calls for “real time issuer disclosures,” the SEC has required firms to disclose a summary of any 
“material definitive agreement not made in the ordinary course of business.” See Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Final Rule: Additional Form 8-K Disclosure Requirements and Acceleration of Filing Date 
[Release Nos. 33-8400; 34-49424; File No. S7-22-02], SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 25, 2004), 
https://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8400.htm [https://perma.cc/V7NU-3DWJ]. 
 162 Reporting companies must disclose contracts “to which directors, officers, promoters, voting 
trustees . . . or underwriters are parties,” “upon which the registrant’s business is substantially 
dependent,” “[involving] the acquisition or sale of any property . . . exceeding 15 percent of [the 
company’s] fixed assets,” and “[a]ny management contract or . . . compensatory plan.” 17 § C.F.R. 
229.601(b)(10)(ii)(A)–(D)(iii)(A). 
 163 Reporting companies must file these forms pursuant to Sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934. 
 164 Filing & Forms, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (last modified Jan. 9, 2017), 
http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml [https://perma.cc/FBA3-29JB]. For a handful of companies, the earliest 
forms available online are from 1993. 
 165 Specifically, registrants follow a numbering convention to distinguish material contracts from 
other types of exhibits. The code for material contracts is “Exhibit 10.” 
113:1121 (2019) A New Strategy for Regulating Arbitration 
1151 
A human-coded audit was conducted to check the accuracy of the 
machine coding. The audit checked the accuracy of the algorithm for choice 
of law and arbitration for 1000 randomly selected contracts. The algorithm 
successfully coded the choice of law clause for 98.1% of contracts. It also 
successfully coded the arbitration clause for 99.3% of contracts. 
B. Results 
Table 2 shows how arbitration rates vary by contract type. There are 
791,362 total contracts in the sample. The average arbitration rate across all 
contracts is 19%. 
Employment agreements have the highest rate of arbitration, at 42%. 
The type of contract least likely to include an arbitration provision is credit 
agreements, at 4%. Employment agreements and credit agreements are also 
the two most common types of contracts in the sample. Each account for 
about 20% of all contracts disclosed to the SEC. 
TABLE 2: ARBITRATION RATE BY CONTRACT TYPE 
 Arbitration Rate Share of Total Number of 
Contracts 
Employment 0.42 0.18 140,980 
Joint Venture 0.31 0.01 4,869 
Service 0.30 0.05 39,592 
Settlement 0.27 0.09 74,953 
Consulting 0.24 0.02 13,957 
Lease 0.21 0.03 27,467 
Merger 0.21 0.01 9,561 
Purchase 0.18 0.10 79,459 
Other 0.17 0.09 67,880 
Insurance 0.17 0.05 36,328 
Shareholders 
Agreement 
0.16 0.01 7,878 
Pension 0.14 0.02 13,731 
Partnership 0.14 0.01 10,623 
Negotiable 
Instrument 
0.05 0.12 96,561 
Credit 0.04 0.21 167,523 
Total 0.19 1.00 791,362 
 
Figure 2 presents the trend in arbitration rates over time. Specifically, it 
graphs the arbitration rate each year, separately for employment agreements 
and all others. “All others” thus includes the fourteen categories besides 
employment. The arbitration rate for employment and non-employment 
contracts has been roughly constant for the last twenty years. 
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I draw two conclusions from these data. First, employment arbitration 
is common, both in an absolute and relative sense. Second, given the stability 
of employment arbitration rates over time, it seems likely that employment 
arbitration will remain common in the future.  
C. The Principal Challenge of Machine Learning in Empirical  
Legal Studies 
Finally, it is worth reflecting on a limitation of this empirical section. 
The empirical section was initially motivated by the case of Nitro-Lift v. 
Howard (discussed in the Introduction), in which an employer used 
arbitration to enforce an otherwise invalid noncompete provision. In 
previous work, I had found that noncompetes were common even in 
jurisdictions that expressly void them.166 The initial goal of the empirical 
section was thus to investigate the relationship between arbitration and 
noncompete provisions using machine learning protocols. 
This goal, however, was not realized. A hand-coding audit revealed that 
the typical words and phrases used to craft noncompete provisions 
substantially overlapped with those of other common secrecy provisions, 
such as nonsolicitation and confidentiality provisions. For this reason, the 
standard machine learning protocols that successfully identified employment 
agreements and arbitration provisions were relatively unsuccessful at 
distinguishing noncompetes from other secrecy provisions. 
This example speaks to a more general challenge—perhaps the 
principal challenge—facing scholars who use machine learning protocols to 
study legal texts. Loosely speaking, one might imagine a spectrum of 
questions to ask of a legal text, ranging from the very specific to the very 
general. On one extreme lie questions involving specific facts, such as: “Did 
the parties choose litigation or arbitration?” or “Who is the plaintiff?” On the 
other extreme lie questions involving very general concepts, such as: “Is this 
an employment contract?” or “Is this a judicial opinion?” 
In my view, the literature has tended toward questions at these extremes 
because they are relatively well-suited to machine learning protocols—but 
the real action lies in the middle ground. In the middle ground are questions 
such as: “Have the parties agreed not to compete with each other?” or “Does 
the judicial opinion approve the use of legislative history?” These questions, 
while susceptible to reliable human coding, are tricky for the machine 
because they demand precise applications of broad concepts—such as 
“competition” or “statutory interpretation”—that evade algorithmic 
 
 166 See Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach, 34 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 650 
(2018). 
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definition. Answering these questions with machine learning protocols 
would effectively enable scholars to apply (rudimentary) legal reasoning at 
scale. Thus, the challenge for the emerging literature that applies machine 
learning techniques is to resist the temptation of low-hanging questions lying 
at the extremes, and instead develop methods for addressing the more 
stubborn, yet perhaps more fruitful, questions that live in the middle. 
FIGURE 2: SHARE OF CONTRACTS WITH ARBITRATION PROVISIONS 
III. WHAT STATES CAN DO 
In this Part, I outline a new strategy for states in response to the 
problems outlined in Part I. Federal arbitration law effectively eliminates 
states’ ability to enforce, or monitor enforcement of, their own laws in 
contract actions. Section A describes the proposed solution: Focus on 
deterring the formation of contracts that, if performed, would contravene 
state policy. Section B uses two examples to explore the details of 
implementing this strategy. 
A. The Strategy: Deterrence over Enforcement 
States cannot directly regulate arbitration, and the only way to change 
this is through congressional action. Congress has previously limited the 
scope of the FAA in several contexts, such as in motor vehicle franchise 
agreements, consumer credit agreements, whistleblower-related actions, and 
sales of securities (though some federal laws limiting the scope of the FAA 
were later repealed).167 But recent efforts to enact limits to the FAA’s reach 
 
 167 See, e.g., Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 26(n)(2) (2012) (invaliding agreements to 
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in the workplace, particularly to prohibit forced arbitration of sexual 
harassment, have been unsuccessful. Given the current congressional 
climate, it seems unlikely that these initiatives will be successful in the near 
future.168 
States, however, can act without Congress. To do so, they must change 
the way they enforce policies. Rather than relying on contract enforcement 
(or nonenforcement), states should deter formation of contracts that 
contravene public policy. I next consider two examples. The first example 
shows how states can indirectly enforce state policies on noncompetes by 
deterring parties from forming noncompete agreements (rather than directly 
enforcing the policy in contract actions). The second example shows how 
states can prevent mandatory arbitration of civil rights claims by deterring 
formation of certain types of arbitration agreements. 
B. Example 1: Indirect Enforcement 
1. The Case of Covenants Not to Compete 
States place a variety of limits on the enforceability of noncompetes. 
Some states, such as California and Oklahoma, void noncompetes outright.169 
Nearly all other states enforce covenants not to compete in employment 
contracts as long as the restriction is “reasonable.” The reasonableness test 
 
10 U.S.C. § 987(e)(3) (2012) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration provisions in consumer credit contracts 
with service members and their dependents); Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(o) (2012) (granting the Securities and Exchange Commission authority to regulate 
arbitration agreements between securities dealers and their customers and prohibiting lenders from 
including mandatory arbitration provisions in mortgage contracts) (implemented by 12 C.F.R. 
§ 1026.36(h) but later repealed by Pub. L. No: 115-74 of November 1, 2017); see also Exec. Order No. 
13,673 of July 31, 2014, 79 Fed. Reg. 45,309 (Aug. 5, 2014) (prohibiting mandatory arbitration of certain 
federal procurement contracts) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 13,782 of Mar. 27, 2017, 82 Fed. Reg. 
15,607 (Mar. 30, 2017)); Motor Vehicle Franchise Arbitration Fairness Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) 
(2012) (providing that predispute arbitration provisions in motor vehicle franchise contracts are 
unenforceable). 
 168 See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, S. 987, 112th Cong. (2011); see also Restoring Statutory 
Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, S. 550; 115th Cong. § 2(a)(4) (2017). Section 2(a)(4) of 
the latter provides a statement of congressional intent: “States have a compelling interest in enacting 
rights and remedies to protect the welfare of their citizens, and the Federal Arbitration Act should not be, 
and should not have been, interpreted to preempt State legislation that enacted rights and remedies to 
protect the welfare of their citizens.” 
 169 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 16600 (West 2018) (providing that “every contract by which 
anyone is restrained from engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is to that extent 
void”). California courts have emphasized that there are no exceptions to this rule. See Whyte v. Schlage 
Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443, 1462–63 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); see also Edwards v. Arthur Andersen 
LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 293 (Cal. 2008) (rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow restraint” exception). Montana, 
North Dakota, and Oklahoma also have similar blanket prohibitions. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-703 
(2017); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-08-06 (2018); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 217 (West 2018). 
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is typically formulated as a limitation on the time and geographic scope of 
the noncompete.170 
The economic rationale for limiting freedom of contract in this way can 
be divided into two categories: to protect parties inside the contract and to 
protect parties outside the contract.171 On the first, limiting enforcement of 
noncompetes protects vulnerable employees with little or no bargaining 
power. These employees are unlikely to have access to counsel, and therefore 
may not appreciate precisely how noncompetes limit their future 
employment. Indeed, a large body of empirical literature documents that 
laypersons do not read agreements or understand their contractual 
liabilities.172 Thus, many employees may not even be aware that they are 
subject to a noncompete. Limiting enforcement of noncompetes also protects 
parties outside the contract. Noncompetes negatively affect society, as other 
employers are unable to hire persons subject to noncompetes. Thus, a policy 
of not enforcing noncompetes promotes labor market mobility and 
information spillovers, both of which generate innovation.173 However, 
noncompetes may also produce welfare benefits. For example, they may 
incentivize employers to invest in their employees’ human capital.174 An 
optimal policy, therefore, must balance these competing interests. 
The problem with states’ noncompete policies, however, is that they are 
unenforceable in practice. Private parties can contract around them with 
arbitration and choice of law. This was the issue in Nitro-Lift v. Howard, as 
discussed in the Introduction.175 That case involved an employee from 
Oklahoma, where noncompetes are categorically banned. The simple run-
around required the employee to arbitrate under the laws of a jurisdiction that 
permits noncompetes—in that case, Louisiana. If the contract did not include 
an arbitration provision and were instead litigated, an Oklahoma state court 
would invalidate the choice of law provision, apply Oklahoma law, and thus 
 
 170 See, e.g., Reed, Roberts Assocs., Inc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307 (1976) (“[A] restrictive 
covenant will only be subject to specific enforcement to the extent that it is reasonable in time and area, 
necessary to protect the employer’s legitimate interests, not harmful to the general public and not 
unreasonably burdensome to the employee.”). 
 171 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 88 (1989). 
 172 See, e.g., Yannis Bakos et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to 
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 (2014); Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading 
Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546 (2014). 
 173 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: 
Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (1999) (arguing that 
California’s noncompete policy would have such effects). 
 174 See, e.g., Mark J. Garmaise, Ties that Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive 
Compensation, and Firm Investment, 27 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 376 (2011). 
 175 568 U.S. 17 (2012). 
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void the noncompete. One might think that Oklahoma law would still be 
enforced so long as the arbitrator applies the correct conflict of laws analysis. 
The problem is that an arbitrator may not be so inclined. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has all but encouraged arbitrators to ignore conflict of laws.176 
2. The Policy Strategy 
Given that the Supreme Court has effectively enabled parties to opt out 
of state policy, what should states do? Since states can do nothing about 
enforcement, the answer is that they should instead deter formation of 
noncompete agreements. For example, a state could issue civil fines against 
employers that form noncompetes with employees and enforce this by 
offering employees whistleblower rewards to report violations. The essential 
legal feature of this approach is that it creates a structure in which vindicating 
the policy (that is, eliminating noncompetes) does not require an action in 
contract. The creation of such a mechanism is necessary, since these actions 
will be sent to arbitration and cannot be monitored. 
More generally, states should develop clear rules concerning 
noncompetes, and then prohibit formation of contracts that do not adhere to 
these rules. In this way, states may calibrate their noncompete policy without 
relying on arbitration for enforcement. Instead of using the ubiquitous 
“reasonableness” test of most jurisdictions, states should enact simple rules 
as to time and geography. For example, the maximum scope for, say, New 
York, might be “two years, within the state of New York, and within an 
industry defined by the Global Industrial Standard Classification.” Then, 
New York could adopt the same mechanism—a whistleblower incentive for 
employees—to deter formation of agreements that exceed these clear limits. 
No state has expressly adopted such an approach, but some states have 
come close. In the Illinois Freedom to Work Act, Illinois recently prohibited 
noncompetes for “low-wage” employees (defined by the employee’s hourly 
 
 176 In its concluding paragraph in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court explains why: 
We have been clear in rejecting the supposition that the advantages of the arbitration process 
somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context. Arbitration agreements allow 
parties to avoid the costs of litigation, a benefit that may be of particular importance in 
employment litigation, which often involves smaller sums of money than disputes concerning 
commercial contracts. These litigation costs to parties (and the accompanying burden to the 
courts) would be compounded by the difficult choice-of-law questions that are often presented in 
disputes arising from the employment relationship, and the necessity of bifurcation of proceedings 
in those cases where state law precludes arbitration of certain types of employment claims but not 
others. 
532 U.S. 105, 123 (2001) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). It added that arbitration generally 
avoids the “complexity and uncertainty” of such issues. Id. 
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wages).177 The problem with this law is that it was not coupled with an easy 
mechanism for private enforcement—i.e., whistleblower incentives of the 
kind explained above. Further, there is no clear schedule of fines associated 
with violations. There is therefore little to deter employers from flouting the 
prohibition, especially against uninformed employees. 
The first high-profile suit brought by the Illinois Attorney General 
under the shadow of the new Illinois statute demonstrates its limits.178 The 
suit challenged the sandwich chain Jimmy John’s and its practice of 
including noncompetes in its contracts with rank-and-file employees.179 
Illinois’s position was that these noncompetes were not permitted under 
existing common law.180 
Jimmy John’s “defense” was that, even if the noncompetes were 
unenforceable, it never tried to enforce the noncompete.181 This is nonsense. 
The power of a noncompete against a rank-and-file employee is in the threat, 
not the execution. Thus, an employer could include the provision in a 
standard form contract, never enforce it, and still discourage at least some 
employees from competing. Further, even a sophisticated rank-and-file 
employee who knows her legal obligations may hesitate to “breach” this 
unenforceable agreement, if only for fear of costly arbitration. In the 
settlement, Jimmy John’s agreed to pay $100,000 to raise awareness of the 
new noncompete law. Without a robust whistleblower regime, however, it is 
difficult to see how this will deter future violations of the new statute. 
 
 177 See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 90/10 (West 2018). The Act was passed partially in response to 
Illinois courts’ increased scrutiny of employment noncompetes. See, e.g., Fifield v. Premier Dealership 
Servs., 993 N.E.2d 938 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013). 
 178 The new statute did not apply to this case. The Jimmy John’s suit settled in December 2016, while 
the new statute applied only to contracts formed on or after January 1, 2017. 
 179 See Complaint, People v. Jimmy John’s Enters., LLC, No. 2016-CH-07746 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 8, 
2016), available at https://will.illinois.edu/nfs/JimmyJohnsComplaintFILED.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
J2DV-Q27E]. 
 180 Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan claimed that Jimmy John’s “lack[ed] any legitimate 
business interest to justify the [noncompete] agreements, the agreements [were] not supported by 
adequate consideration, and the agreements [were] not narrowly tailored.” Id. at 2. 
 181 Jimmy John’s cited a similar case filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois, in which employees of Jimmy John’s sought a declaratory judgment to determine the 
enforceability of the noncompete. The court held that the employees lacked standing to pursue the claim 
because they did not allege that Jimmy John’s had enforced the noncompete against them at any point in 
the past, and because they did not possess “a reasonable fear of litigation.” See Brunner v. Liautaud, No. 
14-C-5509, 2015 WL 5086388, at *24–31 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 8, 2015). 
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C. Example 2: Preventing (Mandatory) Arbitration 
1. The Case of Civil Rights Claims 
Arbitration provisions in employment contracts are typically broad in 
scope, providing for arbitration for “any dispute” that arises during 
employment. Until recently, it was not clear whether such provisions could 
lawfully include all civil rights claims. 
The question was settled in 1991. In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., the U.S. Supreme Court held that employers and employees can 
specifically enforce predispute agreements to arbitrate claims arising under 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act.182 Then, later in the same year, 
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991. In it, Congress specifically 
encourages arbitration of all civil rights claims: “Where appropriate and to 
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute 
resolution, including settlement negotiations, conciliation, . . . and 
arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or 
provisions of Federal law amended by this title.”183 To the best of my 
knowledge, this is the first express statement by the Congress in support of 
a “national policy favoring arbitration.” 
Employers and employees are both enabled and encouraged to keep 
civil rights claims out of public courts. Yet states and the public have an 
interest in encouraging the opposite. They have an interest in both 
monitoring enforcement of civil rights in the workplace and affording 
employees certain procedural protections. Given these interests, how can 
states bring civil rights disputes back into public courts? 
2. The Policy Strategy 
The strategy is to craft a law that does not interfere with the arbitral 
process—and therefore avoids preemption. Any law must allow arbitration 
of civil rights claims to proceed. For example, a simple law prohibiting 
mandatory arbitration of sexual harassment claims—such as the one recently 
passed by New York184—would, if challenged, surely be preempted by the 
FAA. 
Further complicating the issue, even if states could prohibit arbitration 
of all civil rights claims, it is not obvious whether they should. Some 
employees may prefer to arbitrate their civil rights claims, and so compelling 
 
 182 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991). 
 183 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012); see also Mara Kent, “Forced” vs. Compulsory Arbitration of Civil 
Rights Claims, 23 LAW & INEQ. 1, 97–99 (2005) (discussing the Civil Rights Act of 1991). 
 184 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7515 (McKinney 2018); see also California measure AB 3080, introduced into the 
senate on March 31, 2018 (proposed state legislation to prohibit forced arbitration of sexual harassment 
claims). 
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public litigation in such cases may only compound the harm. In principle, 
therefore, state policy should be designed to empower employees to choose 
their forum after the dispute has arisen, or, equivalently, to incentivize 
employers to grant employees this option. 
States can achieve this by first prohibiting civil rights as a subject matter 
for contracts. After enacting this prohibition, the law could then carve out an 
exemption for post-dispute agreements so that parties may still settle existing 
claims. An example of such a law is as follows: 
(1) No person shall enter into an agreement with any employee concerning the 
civil rights of the employee. All such agreements are illegal and void. 
(2) Section 1 shall not apply to agreements concerning existing legal claims. 
Private enforcement could then proceed as in the noncompete example. 
For example, employees could be empowered to bring a qui tam action on 
behalf of the state to enforce the law. Even if a state does not intervene, these 
actions cannot be sent to arbitration.185 To implement this, states can simply 
copy existing state and federal statutes that enable qui tam actions.186 
This law is not preempted by the FAA for several reasons. First, the law 
does not “derive [its] meaning from the fact that an agreement to arbitrate is 
at issue.”187 Rather, it derives its meaning from the fact that the subject matter 
of the agreement relates to the employee’s civil rights. Indeed, employers 
can violate this law with or without requiring employees to arbitrate civil 
rights disputes; further, employers may still require employees to arbitrate 
civil rights disputes even under this law. 
To see this, consider the following examples. Suppose an employment 
contract prohibits the employee from disclosing any instance of sexual 
harassment. This contract violates the law regardless of whether it includes 
an arbitration agreement, and so the employer would be subject to civil 
penalties. Next suppose an employment contract includes an agreement to 
arbitrate and the employee files suit against the employer alleging sexual 
harassment. Under the FAA, a court would be compelled to submit the claim 
 
 185 In Iskanian v. CLS Transp. L.A., LLC, 59 Cal. 4th 348, 386–87 (2014), the Supreme Court of 
California held that employees cannot waive their right to bring representative claims under California’s 
Private Attorneys General Act—that is, claims seeking civil penalties against employers for labor code 
violations against other employees—because those claims belong to, and are brought on behalf of, the 
state, which is not a party to the employment contract; see also Sakkab v. Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 
803 F.3d 425, 426 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the Iskanian rule is not preempted by the FAA). 
 186 See, e.g., California’s Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004, CAL. LAB. CODE 
§§ 2698–2699.5; California’s False Claims Act, CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12650 (West 2005); Federal False 
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (2012). 
 187 AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011) (citing Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. 
Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492–93 n.9 (1987). 
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to arbitration—leaving the arbitrator to decide whether the arbitration may 
procced. The proposed law does nothing to alter this result. Instead, it only 
subjects the employer to fines that the state itself may collect directly from 
the employer. Again, these fines are not a consequence of the arbitration 
agreement. They arise because the employer contracted over the employee’s 
civil rights. 
The law also does not interfere with the “fundamental attributes” of 
arbitration or “disfavor[] contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the 
defining features of arbitration agreements.”188 The law does not regulate any 
aspect of the arbitral process or enable a court to refuse to enforce an 
arbitration agreement under any circumstance. 
Though this Article does not advocate it, it is worth considering an even 
simpler approach: prohibiting employment contracts altogether. There are 
many legal and economic arguments one might make against such a “brute 
force” law. Yet there is no argument that such a law would be preempted by 
the FAA since, as per the Supreme Court’s requirement,189 it expressly 
applies to “any” contract. It does not “single out” arbitration.190 
Finally, it is worth observing that policies like the one suggested here—
that is, prohibitions of certain classes of contracts—are commonplace. Two 
examples that come to mind are prohibitions on agreements to collude 
among competitors191 and prohibitions on bribery contracts between 
American companies and foreign governments.192 
CONCLUSION 
This Article showed how the last fifty years of Supreme Court 
arbitration jurisprudence has effectively enabled employers and employees 
to opt out of mandatory state law. It also presented new evidence on the 
pervasiveness of employment arbitration by parsing millions of filings with 
the SEC to create a database of nearly 800,000 contracts. Among all types of 
contracts—purchases, joint ventures, credit agreements, and others—
employment agreements are by far the most likely to include an arbitration 
provision. 
 
 188 Kindred Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. P’ship v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1426 (2017); see also Concepcion, 
563 U.S. at 344 (holding that “[r]equiring the availability of classwide arbitration interferes with 
fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA”). 
 189 Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1622 (2018). 
 190 Id. at 1646 (“States may enforce generally applicable rules so long as they do not single out 
arbitration for disfavored treatment.” (citing Kindred Nursing Ctrs., 137 S. Ct. at 1428 n.2)). 
 191 See Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
 192 See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, (a)–(b) (2012). 
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In response to these trends, I offered a new strategy to states to regulate 
arbitration. Federal law would preempt any direct state effort to regulate 
arbitration or prohibit employment disputes from being arbitrated. I therefore 
proposed that states abandon contract enforcement as a policy lever, and 
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